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Abstract
We show that the problem of model checking “ATLwith Plausibility” is
∆P3 -complete. We consider two variants of the logic: one with abstract
terms describing plausibility sets, and another one where plausibility as-
sumptions are imposed through formulae of ATLI [19]. In both cases,
the complexity results are the same.
1 Introduction
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [1, 2] is a temporal logic that incorpo-
rates some basic game-theoretical notions. In [15], we extended ATL with
a notion of plausibility, which can be used to model and reason about what
agents can plausibly achieve. Our intuition was to use game-theoretical so-
lution concepts (like Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, dominant strate-
gies etc.) to define what it means to play rationally, and then to assume it
plausible that agents behave in a rational way. Technically, some strategies
(or rather strategy profiles) were assumed plausible in a given model, and one
could reason about what can happen if only the plausible profiles are used.
The formulation of alternating-time temporal logic with plausibility (ATLP)
from [15] was rather abstract, with unstructured terms used to address vari-
ous rationality assumptions, and their denotation “hard-wired” in themodel.
In [16], we proposed to refine the language of terms so that it would allow to
specify sets of rational strategy profiles in the object language. The idea was
to build the terms on formulae of ATLI (ATL with intentions, [19]), as these
can be used to describe sets of strategies and strategy profiles.
This technical report complements [16] by giving amore detailed account
of the model checking complexity for the resulting logic.
1
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we summarize somemodal logics for reasoning about agents
in game-like scenarios: first, the basic logic ofATL [1, 2]; then, its two exten-
sionsATLP [15] andATLI [19].
2.1 Alternating-time Temporal Logic
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [1, 2] enables reasoning about temporal
properties and strategic abilities of agents. Formally, the language of ATL is
given as follows.
Definition 1 (LATL [1, 2]) Let Agt = {1, . . . , k} be a nonempty finite set of all
agents, and Π be a set of propositions (with typical element p). We will use symbol
a to denote a typical agent, andA to denote a typical group of agents fromAgt. The
logic LATL(Agt,Π) is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ.
Informally, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ says that agentsAhave a collective strategy to enforceϕ.
ATL formulae include the usual temporal operators: h(“in the next state”),
 (“always from now on”) and U (strict “until”). Additionally, ♦ (“now or
sometime in the future”) can be defined as ♦ϕ ≡ >U ϕ. It should be noted
that the path quantifiers A,E of computation tree logic CTL [8] can be ex-
pressed in ATL with 〈〈∅〉〉, 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively. The semantics of ATL is de-
fined in so-called concurrent game structures.
Definition 2 (CGS [2]) A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple:M =
〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉, consisting of: a setAgt = {1, . . . , k} of agents; a nonempty
set St of states; set Π of atomic propositions; valuation of propositions
pi : St → P(Π); set Act of actions. Function d : Agt × St → P(Act) indi-
cates the actions available to agent a ∈ Agt in state q ∈ St; it is required that
d(a, q) is nonempty for every a, q. We will often write da(q) instead of d(a, q), and
use d(q) to denote the set d1(q) × · · · × dk(q) of action profiles in state q. Fi-
nally, o is a transition function which maps each state q ∈ St and action profile−→α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(q) to another state q′ = o(q,−→α ).
A computation or path λ = q0q1 · · · ∈ St+ is an infinite sequence of states
such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1.We define λ[i] = qi to
denote the i-th state of λ. ΛM denotes all paths in M . The set of all paths
starting in q is given by ΛM (q).
DEPARTMENTOF INFORMATICS 2
MODEL CHECKING RATIONAL PLAY
Definition 3 (Strategy, outcome [1, 2]) A (memoryless) strategy of agent
a is a function sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q).1 We denote the set of
such functions by Σa. A collective strategy sA for team A ⊆ Agt specifies an
individual strategy for each agent inA; the set ofA’s collective strategies is given by
ΣA =
∏
a∈A Σa. The set of all strategy profiles is given by Σ = ΣAgt.
The outcome of strategy sA in state q is defined as the set of all paths that may
result from executing sA from state q on: out(q, sA) = {λ ∈ ΛM (q) | ∀i ∈ N0 ∃−→α =
〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(λ[i]) ∀a ∈ A (αa = saA(λ[i]) ∧ o(λ[i],−→α ) = λ[i + 1])}, where saA
denotes agent a’s part of the collective strategy sA.
The semantics ofATL is given by the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such thatM,λ[1] |= ϕ for allλ ∈ out(q, sA)
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such thatM,λ[i] |= ϕ for all λ ∈ out(q, sA)
and i ∈ N0
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that, for all λ ∈ out(q, sA), there is
i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
2.2 ATL with Plausibility: Reasoning about Rational
Agents
Agents usually have limited ability to predict the future. However, some lines
of action seem oftenmore sensible or realistic than others. Having defined a
rationality criterion, we obtainmeans to determine themost plausible plays,
and compute their outcome. In [15], we proposed an extension of ATL for
reasoning about rational agents, which had in turn been inspired by the
work by Van Otterloo and colleagues [31, 29, 30] and the research on social
laws [24, 22, 27]. We called the logicATLP, i.e., “ATLwith plausibility”.
Definition 4 (LATLP [15]) LetAgt,Π be as before, andΩ be a set of plausibility
terms (with typical element ω). The language LATLP(Agt,Π,Ω) is defined recur-
sively as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ϕ | Plϕ | Phϕ | (set-pl ω)ϕ.
1 This is a deviation from the original semantics ofATL [1, 2], where strategies assign agents’
choices to sequences of states (which suggests that agents can recall the whole history of each
game). While the choice between the two types of strategies affects the semantics of mostATL
extensions, both yield equivalent semantics for “pure”ATL [23].
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Pl restricts the considered strategy profiles to ones that are plausible in
the given model. Ph disregards plausibility assumptions, and refers to all
physically available strategies. (set-pl ω) allows to define (or redefine) the
set of plausible strategy profiles to the ones described by plausibility term
ω (in this sense, it implements revision of plausibility). With ATLP, we can
for example say thatPl 〈〈∅〉〉 (closed ∧Ph 〈〈guard〉〉 h¬closed): “it is plausible
that the emergency door will always remain closed, but the guard retains
the physical ability to open them”; or (set-pl ωNE)Pl 〈〈a〉〉♦¬jaila : “sup-
pose that only playing Nash equilibria is rational; then, agent a can plau-
sibly reach a state where he is out of prison”. To define the semantics of
ATLP, we extend CGS to concurrent game structures with plausibility (CGSP).
Apart from an actual plausibility set Υ, a CGSP specifies a plausibility map-
ping [[·]] : St → (Ω → P(Σ)) that maps each term ω ∈ Ω to a set of strategy
profiles, depending on the current state.
Definition 5 (CGSP [15]) A concurrent game structure with plausibility
(CGSP) is given by a tuple
M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o,Υ,Ω, [[·]]〉
where 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉 is a CGS, Υ ⊆ Σ is a set of plausible strategy pro-
files; Ω is a set of of plausibility terms, and [[·]] is a plausibility mapping.
When talking about the outcome of rational/plausible play (e.g., with for-
mula Pl 〈〈A〉〉γ), the strategy profiles that can be used by all the agents are re-
stricted to the ones fromΥ. Thus, coalitionA can only choose strategies that
are substrategies of plausible strategy profiles. Moreover, the agents in Agt\A
can only respond in a way that yields a plausible strategy profile.
Definition 6 (Substrategy, outcome [15]) Let A ⊆ B ⊆ Agt, and let sB
be a collective strategy for B. We use sB [A] to denote the substrategy of sB for
agentsA, i.e., strategy tA such that taA = s
a
B for every a ∈ A. Additionally, for a set
of strategy profiles P , P (sA) denotes all strategy profiles from P that contain sA as
substrategy (i.e., P (sA) = {s′ ∈ P | s′[A] = sA}).
LetM be a CGSP, A ⊆ Agt be a set of agents, q ∈ St be a state, sA ∈ ΣA be a
collective strategy ofA, andP ⊆ Σ be a set of strategy profiles. The set out(q, sA, P )
contains all paths whichmay result from agentsA executing sA, when only strategy
profiles from P can be played. Formally: out(q, sA, P ) = {λ ∈ ΛM (q) | ∃z ∈
P (sA)∀i
(
λ[i+1] = o(λ[i], z(λ[i]))
)}. Furthermore,ΣA(P ) denotes allA’s strategies
consistent with P , i.e., ΣA(P ) = {sA ∈ ΣA | ∃t ∈ P sA = t[A]}.
Let P ⊆ ΣAgt be a set of strategy profiles. The semantics of ATLP is given
by the satisfaction relation |=P defined as follows:
M, q |=P p iff p ∈ pi(q)
DEPARTMENTOF INFORMATICS 4
MODEL CHECKING RATIONAL PLAY
M, q |=P ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|=P ϕ
M, q |=P ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |=P ϕ andM, q |=P ψ
M, q |=P 〈〈A〉〉 hϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA(P )withM,λ[1] |=P ϕ for allλ ∈ out(q, sA, P )
M, q |=P 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA(P ) such thatM,λ[i] |=P ϕ for all λ ∈
out(q, sA, P ) and all i ∈ N0
M, q |=P 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA(P ) such that, for all λ ∈ out(q, sA, P ),
there is i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |=P ψ, andM,λ[j] |=P ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i
M, q |=P Plϕ iffM, q |=Υ ϕ
M, q |=P Phϕ iff (M, q) |= ϕ
M, q |=P (set-pl ω)ϕ iffMω, q |=P ϕwhere the newmodelMω is equal toM
but the new setΥω of plausible strategy profiles is set to [[ω]]q.
The “absolute” satisfaction relation |= is given by |=Σ. Note that an ordi-
nary concurrent game structure (without plausibility) can be interpreted as
a CGSPwith all strategy profiles assumed plausible, i.e., withΥ = Σ. In this
way satisfaction ofATLP formulae can be extended to ordinary CGS.
2.3 ATLwith Intentions
ATLI (“ATLwith Intentions”) [19] allows to characterize some solution con-
cepts for extensive games (and concurrent game structures).2 In [16], we pro-
posed to use ATLI for specification of plausibility assumptions. Here, we
briefly recall the main ideas behindATLI.
ATLI [19] extends ATL with formulae (straσa)ϕ with the intuitive read-
ing: “suppose that player a intends to play according to strategy σa, then
ϕ holds”. Thus, it allows to refer to agents’ strategies explicitly via strategic
terms σa ∈ Stra. We assume that allStra are pairwise disjoint. The set of all
strategic terms is denoted byStr =
⋃
a∈AgtStra.
Definition 7 (LATLI [19]) The languageLATLI(Agt,Π,Str) is defined as follows:
θ ::= p | ¬θ | θ ∧ θ | 〈〈A〉〉 hθ | 〈〈A〉〉 θ | 〈〈A〉〉θ U θ | (straσa)θ.
Models ofATLIM = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o, I,Str, ‖·‖〉 extend concurrent
game structures with intention relations I ⊆ St × Agt × Act (with qIaα
meaning that a possibly intends to do action αwhen in q). Moreover, strate-
gic terms are interpreted as strategies according to function ‖·‖ : Str →⋃
a∈Agt Σa such that ‖σa‖ ∈ Σa for σa ∈ Stra. The set of paths consistent with
2 For some previous work on modal characterizations of solution concepts cf. [13, 12, 3, 25,
26].
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all agents’ intentions is defined as ΛI = {λ ∈ ΛM | ∀i ∃α ∈ d(λ[i]) (o(λ[i], α) =
λ[i + 1] ∧ ∀a ∈ Agt λ[i]Iaαa)}. We say that strategy sA is consistent with A’s
intentions if qIasA[a](q) for all q ∈ St, a ∈ A. The intention-consistent outcome
set is defined as: outI(q, sA) = out(q, sA) ∩ ΛI . The semantics of strategic op-
erators inATLI is given as follows:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 hθ iff there is a collective strategy sA consistent with A’s in-
tentions, such that for every λ ∈ outI(q, sA), we have thatM,λ[1] |= θ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 θ andM, q |= 〈〈A〉〉θ U θ′: analogous;
M, q |= (straσ)θ iff revise(M,a, ‖σ‖), q |= θ;
Function revise(M,a, sa) updates modelM by setting a’s intention relation
to I ′a = {〈q, sa(q)〉 | q ∈ St}, so that sa and Ia represent the samemapping in
the resulting model. Note that a “pure” CGSM can be seen as a CGS with
the “full” intention relation I0 = {〈q, a, α〉 | q ∈ St, a ∈ Agt, α ∈ da(q)}.
Additionally, forA = {a1, ..., ar} andσA = 〈σ1, ..., σr〉, wedefine: (strAσA)ϕ ≡
(stra1σ1)...(strarσr)ϕ.
2.4 ATLI-Based Plausibility Terms
Ideally, one would like to have a flexible language of terms that would allow to
specify any sensible rationality assumption, and then impose it on the sys-
tem. Our idea is to use ATLI formulae θ to specify sets of plausible strategy
profiles, with the presumed meaning that Υ collects exactly the profiles for
which θ holds. Then, we can embed such ATLI-based plausibility specifica-
tions in formulae of ATLP in order to reason about rational agents. We call
the resulting languageATLP[ATLI].
Definition 8 (LATLP[ATLI]) Let Ω∗ = {(σ.θ) | θ ∈ LATLI(Agt,Π, {σ[1], . . . , σ[k]})}.
That is, Ω∗ collects terms of the form (σ.θ), where θ is an ATLI formula including
only references to individual agents’ parts of the strategy profile σ. The language of
ATLP[ATLI]is defined as LATLP(Agt,Π,Ω∗).
The idea behind terms of this form is simple. We have an ATLI formula
θ, parameterized with a variable σ that ranges over the set of strategy profiles
Σ. Now, we want (σ.θ) to denote exactly the set of profiles from Σ, for which
formula θ holds. However – as σ denotes a strategy profile, and ATLI allows
only to refer to strategies of individual agents – we need a way of addressing
substrategies of σ in θ. This can be done by using ATLI terms σ[i], which
will be interpreted as the i’s substrategy in σ. Below, we define the concept
formally.
Definition 9 (CGSP for LATLP[ATLI]) Let 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉 be aCGS, and
letΥ ⊆ Σ be a set of plausible strategy profiles.M = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o,Υ,Ω∗, [[·]]〉
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is a CGS with plausibility iff the denotation [[·]] of terms from Ω∗ is defined as fol-
lows.
First, we define a family ofATLImodelsMs = 〈Agt, St,Π, pi, Act, d, o, I0,Str, ‖·‖〉,
one for each strategy profile s ∈ Σ, with Stra = {σ[a]}, and ‖σ[a]‖ = s[a]. Then,
we define the plausibility mapping as:
[[σ.θ]]q = {s ∈ Σ |Ms, q |= θ}.
For example, we may assume that rational agents do not grant the other
agents with toomuch control over their lives:
(σ .
∧
a∈Agt
(straσ[a])¬〈〈Agt \ {a}〉〉♦deada).
Note that games definedbyCGS are, in general, not determined, so the above
specification does not guarantee that each rational agent can efficiently pro-
tect his life. It only requires that he should behave cautiously so that his
opponents do not have complete power to kill him.
3 Model Checking ATLP andATLP[ATLI]
In this section we show that model checking ATLP is∆P3 -complete, which
seems in line with existing results on the complexity of solving games. It is
well known that determining the existence of a solution concept instance
with certain natural properties (e.g., a Nash equilibrium with expected util-
ity of at least k, or a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium) is NP-hard even for
normal form (i.e., one-step) games in the setting of mixed strategies [10, 7].
Similar results are known for extensive turn-based games with imperfect in-
formation and recall [9, 20, 5]. Formally, mixed strategies and imperfect
information are absent in ATLP. However, the framework turns out to be
quite powerful in terms of expressiveness. In particular, imperfect informa-
tion strategies (sometimes called uniform strategies) can be characterized in
ATLP for a relevant subclass of models, and checking strategic properties
of systems in which all agents must play uniform strategies is∆P3 -complete
– which renders ATLP model checking also ∆P3 -complete. This coincides
with another result from game theory: if both players in a 2-player imper-
fect information game have imperfect recall, and chance moves are allowed,
then the problem of finding amax-min pure strategy isΣP2 -complete [20].3
We mainly consider checking formulae of ATLP against “pure” concur-
rent game structures (i.e., we assume that plausibility assumptions will be
specified explicitly in the formula), although we briefly show, too, that the
3 Note that strategic operators can be nested in anATLP formula, thus specifying a sequence
of games, with the outcome of each game depending on the previous ones – and solving such
games requires adaptive calls to aΣP2 oracle.
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functionmcheck(M, q, ϕ, θ1, q1, θ2, q2);
Returns “true” iff ϕ holds in M, q. The current plausibility assumptions are specified by the truth of the
ATLI formula θ1 at state q1. Themost recent plausibility specification (not necessarily incorporated into the
definition of the current plausibility setΥ yet) corresponds to the truth of θ2 at q2.
cases ϕ ≡ p, ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 : proceed as usual;
case ϕ ≡ (set-pl σ.θ′)ψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ, θ1, q1, θ′, q));
case ϕ ≡ Plψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ, θ2, q2, θ2, q2));
case ϕ ≡ Phψ : return(mcheck(M, q, ψ,>, q1, θ2, q2));
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 gψ, where ψ includes some 〈〈B〉〉 : Label all q′ ∈ St, in which
mcheck(M, q, ψ, θ1, q1, θ2, q2) returns “true”, with a newproposition yes. Return
mcheck(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 gyes, θ1, q1, θ2, q2);
case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉 gψ, where ψ includes no 〈〈B〉〉 : Remove all operators Pl , Ph ,
(set-pl ·) from ψ (they are irrelevant, as no cooperation modality comes fur-
ther), yielding ψ′. Return solve(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 gψ′, θ1, q1);
cases 〈〈A〉〉ψ and 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 : analogously ;
end case
Figure 1: Model checkingATLP: main function
results carry over to model checking against CGS with plausibility. The size
of the input is measured with the number of transitions in the model (m)
and the length of the formula (l). Note that the problem of checking ATLP
with respect to the size of the whole CGSP (including the plausibility setΥ),
is trivially linear in the size of the model – but the model size is exponential
with respect to the number of states and transitions.
3.1 Model Checking ATLP[ATLI] is in∆P3
First, we consider the upper bound for complexity of model checkingATLP
with plausibility terms expressed in ATLI. A detailed algorithm for model
checkingATLP[ATLI]formulae against concurrent game structures is presented
in Figures 1 and 2. Apart from the model, the state, and the formula to be
checked, the input includes two plausibility specifications (each represented
by an ATLI formula and a state at which it should be evaluated). The first
specification describes the current set of plausible strategy profiles Υ. The
latter is the argument of the most recent (set-pl ·) operation, not necessar-
ily incorporated into the definitionofΥ yet – unless thePl operator has been
used since. As both CTL and ATLImodel checking is linear in the number
of transitions in the model and the length of the formula [6, 19], we get the
following.
Proposition 1 M, q |= ϕ iffmcheck(M, q, ϕ,>, q,>, q). The algorithm runs in
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function solve(M, q, ϕ, θ, q′);
Returns “true” iffϕ holds inM, q under plausibility assumptions specified by the truth of θ at q′. We assume
thatϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ, whereψ is a propositional formula, i.e., it includes no 〈〈B〉〉,Pl ,Ph , (set-pl ·).
 Label all q′ ∈ St, in which ψ holds, with a new proposition yes;
 Guess a strategy profile s;
 if plausiblestrat(s,M, q′, θ) then return( not beatable(s[A],M, q, 〈〈A〉〉 yes));
else return( false);
function beatable(sA,M, q, 〈〈A〉〉γ, q′, θ);
Returns “true” iff the opponents can beat sA so that it does not enforce γ inM, q under plausibility assump-
tions specified by theATLI formula θ at q′. The path formula γ is of the form eψ,ψ,ψ U ψ′ with propo-
sitionalψ,ψ′.
 Guess a strategy profile t;
 if plausiblestrat(t,M, q′, θ) and t[A] = sA then
− M ′ := “trim” M , removing all transitions that cannot occur when t is
executed;
− return(mcheckCTL(M ′, q,Aγ));
else return( false);
function plausiblestrat(s,M, q, θ);
Checks if strategy profile s satisfies formula θ inM, q.
 return(mcheckATLI(Ms, q, θ)); // For Ms, cf. Definition 9
Figure 2: Model checkingATLP: guessing strategies and counterstrategies
time∆P3 with respect to the number of transitions in the model and the length of
the formula.
3.2 Model CheckingATLPwithArbitraryPlausibility
Terms
The algorithm in Figures 1 and 2 uses theATLI-based plausibility terms pre-
sented in Section 2.4. In the general case, we can think of any arbitrary
implementation of terms in Ω. As long as plausiblestrat(s,M, q, θ) can be
computed in polynomial time, it does not affect the overall complexity of
mcheck. In fact, it is enough to require that plausiblestrat(s,M, q, θ) can be
computed innondeterministicpolynomial time, as thewitness for plausiblestrat
canbe guessed togetherwith the strategy profile s in function solve, andwith
the strategy profile t in function beatable, respectively.
Proposition 2 If the verification of plausibility (plausiblestrat) is inNP, then
the model checking algorithm (mcheck) is in∆P3 with respect tom, l.
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Note that, if a list (or several alternative lists) of plausible strategy profiles
is given explicitly in the model (via the plausibility setΥ and/or the denota-
tions of abstract plausibility terms ω from Section 2.2), then the problem of
guessing an appropriate strategy from such a list is inNP (memoryless strate-
gies have polynomial size with respect tom). As a consequence, we have the
following:
Corollary 3 Model checkingATLP (with both abstract andATLI-based plausi-
bility terms) againstCGSP is in∆P3 with respect tom, l.
3.3 Model Checking ATLP is∆P3 -hard
We prove the∆P3 -hardness through a reduction of SNSAT2, the typical∆P3 -
complete variant of the Boolean satisfiability problem. The reduction fol-
lows in two steps. First, we define a modification of ATLir [23], in which
all agents are required to play only uniform strategies. We call it “uniform
ATLir” (ATLuir in short), and show a polynomial reduction of SNSAT2 to
ATLuir model checking. Then, we point out how each formula andmodel of
ATLuir can be equivalently translated (in polynomial time) to a CGS and a
formula of ATLP[ATLI], thus yielding a polynomial reduction of SNSAT2 to
ATLP[ATLI]. Again, we consider two cases: ATLP with arbitrary plausibility
terms, and ATLP with terms defined through formulae of ATLI. The first
part of the reduction (from SNSAT2 to model checking ATLuir) is the same
in both cases, but the second part (from model checking ATLuir to ATLP)
proceeds differently, and we discuss both variants accordingly.
Readers interested in additional technical details are referred to [17, 18, 14,
11], where important parts of our construction are described.
3.3.1 UniformATLir
First, we introduce the logic of “uniform ATLir” (ATLuir). The idea is based
on Schobbens’s ATLir [23], i.e., ATL for agents with imperfect information
and imperfect recall. There, it was assumed that the coalition A in formula
〈〈A〉〉irϕ can only use strategies that assign same choices in indistinguishable
states (so called uniform strategies). Then, the outcome of every strategy ofA
was evaluated against every possible behavior of the remaining agentsAgt\A
(with no additional assumption with respect to that behavior).
In ATLuir, we assume that the opponents (Agt \ A) are also required to re-
spond with a uniform memoryless strategy. The syntax ofATLuir is the same as
that ofATL, only cooperationmodalities are annotatedwith additional tags
ir and u to indicate the imperfect information and recall, anduniformity of
all agents’ strategies.
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The semantics ofATLuir can be defined as follows. First, we define models
as concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS), i.e. CGS with epistemic rela-
tions ∼a⊆ St × St, one per agent. (The intended meaning of q ∼a q′ is that
agent a cannot distinguish between between states q and q′.) Additionally,
we require that agents have the same options in indistinguishable states, i.e.,
that q ∼a q′ implies da(q) = da(q′). A (memoryless) strategy sA is uniform if
q ∼a q′ implies saA(q) = saA(q′) for all q, q′ ∈ St, a ∈ A. To simplify the nota-
tion, we define [q]a = {q′ | q ∼a q′} to be the class of states indistinguishable
from q for a; [q]A =
⋃
a∈A[q]a collects all the states that are indistinguishable
from q for somemember of the groupA; finally, out(Q, sA) =
⋃
q∈Q out(q, sA)
collects all the execution paths of strategy sA from states in setQ.
Now, the semantics is given by the clauses below:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, q |= ϕ andM, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉uir hϕ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every uni-
form counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉),4 we have
M,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉uirϕ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every
uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉), we have
M,λ[i] |= ϕ for all i = 0, 1, ...;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉irϕU ψ iff there is a uniform strategy sA such that, for every
uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A, and λ ∈ out([q]A, 〈sA, tAgt\A〉), there is
i ∈ N0 withM,λ[i] |= ψ, andM,λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
3.3.2 Reduction of SNSAT2 toModel Checking of ATLuir
We recall the definition of SNSAT2 after [21].
Definition 10 (SNSAT2)
Input: p sets of propositional variables Xr = {x1,r, ..., xk,r}, p sets of proposi-
tional variables Yr = {y1,r, ..., yk,r}, p propositional variables zr, and p Boolean
formulae ϕr in positive normal form (i.e., negation is allowed only on the level of
literals). Each ϕr involves only variables in Xr ∪ Yr ∪ {z1, ..., zr−1}, with the fol-
lowing requirement: zr ≡ ∃Xr∀Yr.ϕr(z1, ..., zr−1, Xr, Yr).
Output: The value of zp.
Note that every non-literal formula ϕr can be written as χ1 op χ2 with op ∈
{∧,∨}. Recursively, χi can be written as χi1 opi χi2 and χij as χij1 opij χij2 etc.
4 Note that the definition of concurrent game structures, that we use after [2], implies that
CGS are deterministic, so there is in fact exactly one such path λ.
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Figure 3: CEGSM2 for ϕ1 ≡ ((x1 ∧ x2)∨¬y1)∧ (¬x1 ∨ y1), ϕ2 ≡ z1 ∧ (¬z1 ∨ y2).
Our reduction of SNSAT2 is an extension of the reduction of SNSAT pre-
sented in [17, 18]. That is, we construct the CEGS Mr corresponding to zr
with two players: verifier v and refuter r. The CEGS is turn-based, that is,
every state is “governed” by a single player who determines the next tran-
sition. Each subformula χi1...il of ϕr has a corresponding state qi1...il inMr.
If the outermost logical connective of ϕr is ∧, the refuter decides at q0 which
subformulaχi ofϕr is to be satisfied, by proceeding to the “subformula” state
qi corresponding to χi. If the outermost connective is ∨, the verifier decides
which subformula χi ofϕr will be attempted at q0. This procedure is repeated
until all subformulae are single literals. The states corresponding to literals
are called “proposition” states.
The difference from the construction from [17, 18] is that formulae are
in positive normal form (rather than CNF) and that we have two kinds of
“proposition” states now: qi1...il refers to a literal consisting of some x ∈ Xr
and is governed by v; q¯i1...il refers to some y ∈ Yr and will be governed by r.
Now, the values of the underlying propositional variables x, y are declared at
the “propositional” states, and the outcome is computed. That is, if v exe-
cutes > for a positive literal, i.e. χi1...il = x, (or ⊥ for χi1...il = ¬x) at qi1...il ,
then the system proceeds to the “winning” state q>; otherwise, the system
goes to the “sink” state q⊥. For states q¯i1...il the procedure is analogous. Mod-
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els corresponding to subsequent zr are nested like in Figure 3.5 “Proposi-
tion” states referring to the same variable x are indistinguishable for v (so
that he has to declare the same value of x in all of them), and the states re-
ferring to the same y are indistinguishable for r. A soleATLuir proposition yes
holds only in the “winning” state q>. As in [17, 18], we have the following
result which concludes the reduction.
Proposition 4 The above construction depicts a polynomial reduction ofSNSAT2
to model checkingATLuir in the following sense. Let
Φ1 ≡ 〈〈v〉〉uir(¬neg)U yes, and
Φr ≡ 〈〈v〉〉uir(¬neg)U (yes ∨ (neg ∧ 〈〈∅〉〉uir h¬Φr−1)) for r = 2, . . . , p.
Then, we have zp iffMp, q
p
0 |=ATLuir Φp.
Note that there is a straightforward∆P3 algorithm that model-checks for-
mulae of ATLuir: when checking 〈〈A〉〉uirTϕ inM, q, it first recursively checks
ϕ (bottom-up), and labels the states where ϕ held with a special proposition
yes. Then, the algorithm guesses a uniform strategy sA and calls an oracle
that guesses a uniform counterstrategy tAgt\A. Finally, it trimsM according
to 〈sA, tAgt\A〉, and calls aCTLmodel checker to check formulaAT yes in state
q of the resultingmodel. This gives us the following result.
Proposition 5 Model checking ATLuir is∆P3 -complete with respect to the num-
ber of transitions in the model and the length of the formula. It is ∆P3 -complete
even for turn-basedCEGSwith at most two agents.
3.3.3 FromATLuir to ATLPwith Arbitrary Plausibility Terms
Nowwe showhowATLuirmodel checking can be reduced tomodel checking
of ATLP. We are given a CEGSM , a state q inM , and an ATL uir formula ϕ.
First, we sketch the reduction to model checking arbitrary ATLP formulae
against CGSP (i.e., CGSwith plausibility sets given explicitly in the model).
Let Σu be the set of all uniform strategy profiles inM . We take CGSPM ′ as
M (sans epistemic relations) extended with plausibility setΥ = Σu. Then:
M, q |=ATLuir 〈〈A〉〉
u
irϕ iff M
′, q |=ATLP Pl 〈〈A〉〉ϕ,
which completes the reduction.6
5 All states in themodel for zr are additionally indexed by r.
6 Wenote in passing that, technically, the size of the resultingmodelM ′ is not entirely poly-
nomial. M ′ includes the plausibility set Υ, which is exponential in the number of states inM
(since it is equal to the the set of all uniform strategy profiles inM ). This is of course the case
when we want to store Υ explicitly. However, checking if a strategy profile is uniform can be
done in time linear wrt the number of states inM , so an implicit representation of Υ (e.g., the
checking procedure itself) requires only linear space.
We do not discuss this issue in more depth, as we focus on the other variant of ATLP (with
ATLI-based terms) in this paper.
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For model checking ATLP formulae with abstract terms ω against “pure”
concurrent game structures, the reduction is similar. We take CGS M ′ as
M minus epistemic relations, and plus a plausibility mapping [[·]] such that
[[ω]]q = Σu. Then, again,
M, q |=ATLuir 〈〈A〉〉
u
irϕ iff M
′, q |=ATLP (set-pl ω)Pl 〈〈A〉〉ϕ.7
3.3.4 FromATLuir to ATLPwith ATLI-Based Plausibility Terms
The reduction of ATLuir model checking to model checking of ATLP
[ATLI]
against “pure” CGS is more sophisticated. We do not present a reduction
for full model checking of ATLuir; it is enough to show the reduction for the
kind of models that we get in Section 3.3.2 (i.e., turn-basedmodels with two
agents, two “final” states q>, q⊥, no cycles except for the loops at the final
states, and uncertainty appearing only in states one step before the end of
the game).
First, we reconstruct the concurrent epistemic game structure Mp from
Section 3.3.2 so that the last action profile is always “remembered” in the
final states. Then, we show how uniformity of strategies can be character-
ized with a formula of ATLI extended with epistemic operators. Next, we
show how the model and the formula can be transformed to get rid of epis-
temic links and operators (yielding a “pure” CGS and a formula of “pure”
ATLI). Finally, we show how the resulting characterization of uniformity
can be “plugged” into an ATLP formula to require that only uniform strat-
egy profiles are taken into account.
Adding more final states to the model. To recall, the input of ATLuir
model checking consists in our case of a concurrent epistemic game structure
Mp (like the one in Figure 3) and anATLuir formulaΦp (cf. Proposition 4). We
begin the reduction by reconstructingMp toM ′p in which the last action pro-
file is “remembered” in the final states. The idea is based on the construction
from [11, Proposition 16] where it is applied to all states of the system, cf. Fig-
ure 4.
In our case, we first create copies of states q>, q⊥, one per incoming transi-
tion. That is, the construction yields states of the form 〈q, α1, . . . , αk〉, where
q ∈ {q>, q⊥} is a final state of the originalmodelMp, and 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 is the ac-
tionprofile executed just before the systemproceeded to q. Each copyhas the
samevaluationof propositions as the original state q, i.e., pi′(〈q, α1, . . . , αk〉) =
pi(q). Then, for each action α ∈ Act and agent i ∈ Agt, we add a new proposi-
tion i : α. Moreover, we fix the valuation of i : α inM ′p so that it holds exactly
7 Cf. footnote 6.
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Figure 4: Memorizing the last action profile in a simple 2-agent system
in the final states that can be achieved by an action profile in which i exe-
cutes α (i.e., states 〈q, α1, ..., αi, ..., αk〉). Note that the number of both states
and transitions inM ′p is linear in the transitions ofMp.
The transformation produces modelM ′p which is equivalent toMp in the
following sense: let ϕ be a formula of ATLuir that does not involve special
propositions i : α. Then, for all q ∈ St:
Mp, q |=ATLuir ϕ iff M
′
p, q |=ATLuir ϕ.
In M ′p, agents can “recall” their actions executed at states that involved
some uncertainty (i.e., states in which the image of some indistinguishabil-
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ity relation ∼i was not a singleton). Now we can use ATLI (with additional
help of knowledge operators, see below) to characterize uniformity of strate-
gies.
ATLI+Knowledge (ATLI+K) In the next step, we will show that unifor-
mity of a strategy can be characterized in ATLI extended with epistemic op-
erators Ka. Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. The semantics of ATLI+K
extends that ofATLI by adding the standard semantic clause from epistemic
logic:
M, q |= Kaϕ iffM, q′ |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
We note that ATLI+K can be also seen as ATEL [28] extended with inten-
tions.
Characterizing uniformity in ATLI+K. Let us now consider the fol-
lowing formula ofATLI+Knowledge:
uniform(σ) ≡ (strσ)〈〈∅〉〉
∧
i∈Agt
∨
α∈d(i,q)
Ki〈〈∅〉〉 hi : α.
The reading of uniform(σ) is: suppose that profile σ is played (strσ); then, for
all reachable states (〈〈∅〉〉 ), every agent has a single action (∧i∈Agt∨α∈d(i,q))
that is determined for execution (〈〈∅〉〉 hi : α) in every state indistinguishable
from the current state (Ki). Thus, formula uniform(σ) characterizes the uni-
formity of strategy profile σ. Formally, for every concurrent epistemic game
structureM , we have thatM, q |=ATLI+K uniform(σ) iff ‖σ[a]‖ is uniform for
each agent a ∈ Agt (for all states reachable from q). Of course, only reach-
able statesmatter whenwe look for strategies that should enforce a temporal
goal.
Note that the epistemic operatorKa refers to incomplete information, but
σ is now an arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily uniform) strategy profile. We ob-
serve that the length of the formula is linear in the number of agents and
actions in themodel.
Translating Knowledge to Ability. To get rid of the epistemic opera-
tors from formula uniform(σ) and epistemic relations from model M ′p, we
use the construction from [14] (which refines that from [11, Section 4.4]).
The construction yields a concurrent game structure tr(M ′p) and anATLI for-
mula tr(uniform(σ)). The idea can be sketched as follows. The set of agents
becomes extendedwith epistemic agents ei (one per ai ∈ Agt), yieldingAgt′′ =
Agt∪Agte. Similarly, the set of states is augmentedwith epistemic states qe for
every q ∈ St′ and e ∈ Agte; the states “governed” by the epistemic agent ea
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Figure 5: Getting rid of knowledge and epistemic links
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are labeled with a special proposition ea. The “real” states q from the original
model are called “action” states, and are labeled with another special propo-
sition act. Epistemic agent ea can enforce transitions to states that are indis-
tinguishable for agent a (see Figure 5 for an example).8 Then, “a knows ϕ”
can be rephrased as “ea can only effect transitions to epistemic states where
ϕ holds”. With some additional tricks to ensure the right interplay between
actions of epistemic agents, we get the following translation of formulae:
tr(p) = p, for p ∈ Π
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉 hϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉 h(act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉 (act ∧ tr(ϕ))
tr(〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ) = 〈〈A ∪ Agte〉〉(act ∧ tr(ϕ))U (act ∧ tr(ψ))
tr(Kiϕ) = ¬〈〈e1, ..., ei〉〉 h(ei ∧ 〈〈e1, ..., ek〉〉 h(act ∧ ¬tr(ϕ))).
Note that the length of tr(ϕ) is linear in the length of ϕ and the number
of agents k. Two important facts follow from [14, Theorem 8]:
Lemma 6 For every CEGSM and a formula of ATLuir that does not include the
special propositions act, e1, . . . , ek, we have
M, q |=ATLuir ϕ iff tr(M), q |=ATLuir tr(ϕ).
Lemma 7 For everyCEGSM , we have
M, q |=ATLI+K uniform(σ) iff tr(M), q |=ATLI+K tr(uniform(σ)).
Putting the pieces together: the reduction. We observe that ATLuir
can be seen as ATL where only uniform strategy profiles are allowed. An
ATLI formula that characterizes uniformity has been defined in the previ-
ous paragraphs. It can be now plugged into our “ATL with Plausibility” to
restrict agents’ behavior in the way the semantics of ATLuir does. This way,
we obtain a reduction of SNSAT2 to model checking ofATLP[ATLI].
Proposition 8
zp iff tr(M ′p), q
p
0 |=ATLP[ATLI] (set-pl σ.tr(uniform(σ)))Pl tr(Φp).
Proof. We have zp iff M ′p, q
p
0 |=ATLuir Φp iff tr(M
′
p), q
p
0 |=ATLuir tr(Φp)
iff tr(M ′p), q
p
0 |=ATLP[ATLI] (set-pl σ.tr(uniform(σ)))Pl tr(Φp). 
8 An interested reader is referred to [14] for the technical details of the construction.
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3.4 Summary of the Results
As a result, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 9 Model checkingATLP is∆P3 -complete with respect to the number of
transitions in the model and the length of the formula.
On the way, we have also proved that checking strategic abilities when all
players are required to play uniformly is∆P3 -complete (that is, harder than
ability against the worst line of events captured by ATLir formulae, which
is “only” ∆P2 -complete). We believe it is an interesting result with respect
to verification of various kinds of agents’ ability under incomplete informa-
tion. We note that the result from [20] for extensive games with incomplete
information can be seen as a specific case of our result, at least in the class of
games with binary payoffs.
4 Conclusions
In this technical report, weprove thatmodel checkingATLP is∆P3 -complete,
for abstract plausibility terms as well as terms based on formulae of “ATL
with Intentions” (ATLI).On theway,we also define another interesting vari-
ant ofATL– where both proponents and opponents are required to use only
uniform strategies – and we establish its model checking complexity.
The logics of ATLI and ATLP share many similarities. Thus, it might be
evenmore elegant to “plug in” plausibility specificationswritten inATLP it-
self. A preliminary take on this idea has been presented in [4], but themodel
checking complexity of the resulting language remains to be studied.
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